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ABSTRACT 
Economic and tax crimes account for a significant proportion of criminal activity and result 
in considerable economic damage. In Germany, two of the most prominent offenders in 
this area in recent years were Thomas Middelhoff and Uli Hoeneß, both of whom served 
jail sentences. Taking advantage of the widespread media coverage of both cases, the follow-
ing paper draws on economic theory to compare prison terms with fines. It argues that fines 
are preferred from an economic perspective and can therefore be considered a useful first-
choice punishment in cases involving white-collar and tax crimes. The paper sees itself in 
this regard as a plea.
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I. IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO WHITE-COLLAR AND TAX CRIMES 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was adopted following numerous corporate scan-
dals,1 marked a turning point in international commercial criminal law. On the basis of 
the adopted regulations, a "new hardship" was established against white-collar criminals. 
This is illustrated, for example, by the sentencing of the US financial fraudster Bernard 
Madoff to 150 years imprisonment. The multitude of criminal law norms is astonishing 
in this context, as it leads to increased complexity and ignores the recognition that crimi-
nal law as a control instrument has not been a resounding success.2 
 
The tendency of many courts is to sentence white-collar and tax criminals to imprison-
ment. Typically, the convicts are middle-aged3 and their social standing cannot be com-
pared with that of other criminals. The question therefore arises whether the judicial sys-
tem is sufficiently prepared for this "new hardship", or whether it contains weaknesses 
that make other levels of punishment appear preferable. In particular, the interpretation 
of economic criminal law by the courts must be critically examined to the effect that it is 
developing into a brake on the economy as a result of anti-market economic tendencies.4 
 
The former CEO of Arcandor AG Thomas Middelhoff recently published a book about 
his experiences with the German prison system. In his book, Middelhoff, who served a 
three-year sentence for infidelity at the Essen Penitentiary, describes particularly negative 
conditions during his imprisonment:5 In particular, he discusses an autoimmune disease 
that he had developed during his prison stay and criticizes the conditions at the Essen 
Penitentiary as unacceptable, especially the constant suicide monitoring during the first 
six weeks. This monitoring entailed Middelhoff being woken up every fifteen minutes 
during the night, forcing him to experience sleep deprivation. This in turn led to the for-
mer top manager developing an incurable autoimmune disease that involved weight loss 
and swollen feet; the treatment, Middelhoff writes in his book, also left much to be de-
sired. Middelhoff even compares the prison conditions he experienced with those found 
at Guantanamo, the US-run prison for terrorists. His book represents a judgment with 
the German judiciary. Middelhoff writes about his very small single cell, about question-
able sanitary facilities, and about cold, frosty nights in his cell. Since the book, A115 – Der 
Sturz, now ranks at the top of the German book trade’s sales lists, it cannot be ruled out—
irrespective of the justified criticism of Middelhoff’s behavior and the judicially clarified 			
1  See e.g. John C. Coates, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21(1), JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES, 91-116 (2007). 
2  See HAUKE BRETTEL & HENDRIK SCHNEIDER, WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT, § 1 no. 65 (2nd ed.2018). 
3  See Hendrik Schneider & Dieter John, Der Wirtschaftsstraftäter in seinen sozialen Bezügen. Empirische Be-
funde und Konsequenzen für die Unternehmenspraxis, in Wirtschaftskriminalität, 161-162 (Britta Bannenberg 
& Jörg-Martin Jehle, 2010). 
4  See Hendrik Schneider, Wachstumsbremse Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK 24, 30–37. 
5  See also in the following: THOMAS MIDDELHOFF, A115 – DER STURZ (2017). 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |     VOLUME 5   NUMBER 1   2019 
FLORIAN FOLLERT  |  ON THE PUNISHMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR AND TAX CRIME: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
PAGE  54 
question of guilt—that the German prison system has not suffered a loss of reputation. 
In addition to the health consequences, Middelhoff has also had to file for private insol-
vency. 
 
The chairman of the Supervisory Board of FC Bayern Munich AG, Uli Hoeneß, also has 
had to serve a prison sentence; in his case, at Landsberg Prison for tax evasion. German 
society attaches great importance to economic and tax crimes as illustrated by the follow-
ing three figures. Fig. 1 shows the development of cases of white-collar crime in Germany 
between 2006 and 2016: 
 
 
 Fig. 1: Cases of white-collar crime in Germany (source: Federal Criminal Police Office of 
Germany, 2017) 
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In the area of tax criminal law, cases are also on a comparable scale (fig. 2). This underlines 
their importance in the context of criminal prosecution: 
 
 
Fig. 2: Number of completed tax investigations in Germany (source: Federal Ministry of 
Finance of Germany, 2017)6 
 
 
This results in economic losses running into billions (fig. 3), so that an economic analysis 
of the associated penalties appears justified: 
 
 
Fig. 3: Damage from white-collar crime in Germany (source: Federal Criminal Police Of-
fice 2017) 			
6  Of course, the number of undetected tax offenses should not be underestimated. 	
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In this context, the question of the costs and benefits of imprisonment for tax and eco-
nomic offenses arises. An analysis of punitive measures from an economic perspective is 
an obvious option, as it focuses in particular on costs and benefits.7 On the basis of such 
an economic analysis of economic and tax crimes and the criminal law associated with 
them, it is questionable whether prison sentences for economic and tax offenses can meet 
the efficiency standard at the center of the economic analysis of law in general and crimi-
nal law in particular. From an economic point of view,8 an optimal penalty (P) is found 
if the marginal costs of the penalty (MC(P)) equals the marginal utility (MU(P)): 
 
MC(P)=MU(P) 
 
Therefore, penalty shall be imposed as long as:  
 
MU(P)>MC(P) 
 
Admittedly, an economic analysis of the law must not be interpreted as representing the 
ideal path. Under certain circumstances, economic considerations may have to be put 
aside in favor of legal and political evaluations; however, economic considerations can 
provide an initial indication of efficiency aspects in order to discuss the impact of legal 
norms and judicial decisions.9 
 
The following paper would therefore like to take the Middelhoff and Hoeneß cases as an 
opportunity to carry out an analysis of prison sentences for such offenses on the basis of 
the economic theory of crime and criminal law that can be traced back in particular to 
Gary S. Becker10 and to critically assess the economic efficiency of prison sentences for 
economic and tax offenses. In performing a cost-benefit analysis, the paper focuses on the 
economics of happiness, which can also be applied to the punishment of criminal indi-
viduals.11 
 
 
 			
7  For a cost-benefit analysis: Jacques Stohler, Zur Methode und Technik der Cost-Benefit-Analyse, 20(2), 
KYKLOS, 218–245(1967). 
8  See Bruno S. Frey & Angel Serna, Recht und Wirtschaft: Bemerkungen zu einem interdisziplinären Forschungs-
programm, 2(4), STAATSWISSENSCHAFT UND STAATSPRAXIS, 534–547, 537 f. (1991); Roland Kirstein & Die-
ter Schmidtchen, Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts, 4, CSLE DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (2003). 
9  See Florian Follert, Kriminalität und Strafrecht aus ökonomischer Sicht, 130(2), ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GE-
SAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 420–437, 423 (2018). 
10  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, 169–217 (1968). 
11  It should be noted that only offenses committed by natural persons are considered. 	
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An exact definition of white-collar crime does not exist in the literature.12 Fraud, breach  
of trust, accounting crimes, corruption, and bribery are often subsumed under the label 
of white-collar crime. In this contribution, economic and tax crimes are to be understood 
simply as illegal behavior that serves the goal of improving one’s own financial position. 
This enrichment takes place at the expense of private entities (mostly enterprises) as well 
as at the expense of the state and thus indirectly also at the expense of the general public.13 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF WHITE-COLLAR AND TAX CRIME 
 
Why do individuals evade taxes or commit white-collar crimes? The economic theory of 
crime provides an analytical framework for explaining illegal actions and is by no means 
limited to white-collar crime.14 The economics of crime, which Becker (1968) decisively 
determined, interprets a criminal act as the result of a rational weighing process. Criminal 
action is therefore not the result of a particular personality, but rather should be inter-
preted as rational behavior.15 Becker assumes that after weighing the (expected) costs and 
benefits, people rationally decide for or against taking criminal action: 
“Some persons become ‘criminals’ . . . not because their basic motivation differs 
from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ.”16 
This idea is based on the homo oeconomicus model17 according to which an individual 
commits an action when the expected benefit exceeds the predicted costs, including op-
portunity costs.18 The economic theory of crime assumes a negative price elasticity of the 
demand for crime, which means demand decreases when crimes become more expensive.19 
If the economic theory of crime can be applied to every category of crime, it is not far off 
to apply it to economic and tax crimes as well. The utility of such a crime can be defined 			
12  See also in the following, Karl-Dieter Bussmann, Kriminalitätsprävention durch Business Ethics, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND UNTERNEHMENSETHIK, 35–50 (2004). 
13  However, there are also approaches that consider a minimum level of corruption through the “lubricant 
money in the sense of bureaucratic landscape management” (Eike Emrich & Christian Pierdzioch, Theoretische 
Rahmung. in: Falsches Spiel Im Sport, 15–44, 41 (Eike Emrich, Christian Pierdzioch & Werner Pitsch, 2015) as 
a decision accelerator. See for example: Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Developments Through Bureaucratic Cor-
ruption, 8(3), AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, 8–14, 11 (1964), who speaks of “hedge against bad policy.” 
14  See Bruno S. Frey & Karl-Dieter Opp, Anomie, Nutzen und Kosten: Eine Konfrontation der Anomietheorie 
mit ökonomischen Hypothesen, 30, SOZIALE WELT, 275–294, 281 (1979). 
15  See Bruno S. Frey & Karl-Dieter Opp, Nutzen und Kosten: Eine Konfrontation der Anomietheorie mit öko-
nomischen Hypothesen, 30, SOZIALE WELT, 275–294, 282 (1979). 
16  Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2), JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
176 (1968). 
17  See GEBHARD KIRCHGÄSSNER, HOMO OECONOMICUS (4th ed., 2013). 
18  Of course, pure acts of affect are not considered within the framework of the model. 
19  See Bruno S. Frey & Karl-Dieter Opp, Nutzen und Kosten: Eine Konfrontation der Anomietheorie mit öko-
nomischen Hypothesen, 30, SOZIALE WELT, 275–294, 282 f. (1979). 	
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as the value gained from the crime, less the product of the expected penalty and the likeli-
hood of being sentenced: 
 
U(x)=E-p*P 
With: 
E = enrichment  
p = probability of discovery  
P = penalty 
 
The higher the expected costs (p*P) of an economic crime, the more likely a potential of-
fender will decide against the act.20 Legislation, prosecution, and justice thus provide var-
ious parameters to influence the decision calculation of a potential economic offender.21 
In particular, the nature of the penalty (P), the probability of detection, the probability 
of conviction (p), and the ethical-moral values within a society influence the calculation 
of the potential economic criminal in such a way that the (expected) costs of the action 
exceed the (expected) benefit, and the individual decides on legal activity because criminal 
action is too expensive. Special importance is attached to the probability of detection, 
which Pitsch, Frenger, and Emrich show using the example of doping.22 Accordingly, the 
probability of detection is the decisive component and has a greater influence on the de-
cision of the potential offender than the level of penalty. Moral or moral ideas can also be 
easily integrated into the basic model of homo oeconomicus.23 
 
Becker’s findings were transferred to the area of tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo.24 
According to this model, the value of tax evasion results from the higher disposable in-
come, since in this case the tax liability is not paid. Disposable income is reduced by pen-
alties combined with the likelihood of being discovered and convicted. 
 
 
 
 			
20  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECO-
NOMY, 169–217, 176 (1968); Bruno S. Frey, Plädoyer für eine positive Ökonomik, in Perspektiven der Wirt-
schaftspolitik: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. René L. Frey, 759–766, 761 (Christoph A. 
Schaltegger and Stefan C. Schaltegger,2004). 
21  See Florian Follert, Kriminalität und Strafrecht aus ökonomischer Sicht, 130(2), ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GE-
SAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 420–437, 433–436 (2018). 
22  See Werner Pitsch, Monika Frenger, & Eike Emrich, The impact of anti-doping legislation in Europe—outlines 
for the development of model-based hypotheses, in Sport and Doping. The Analysis of an Antagonistic Symbi-
osis, 71–100 (Eike Emrich and Werner Pitsch, 2011).  
23  See Dieter Schmidtchen, Homo oeconomicus und das Recht, CSLE DISCUSSION PAPER 2000–03, 6 (2000). 
24  See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 (3-4)JOURNAL 
OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 232–238 (1972). 	
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This model, based on deterrence and negative incentives, has been criticized by some au-
thors.25 Critics consider it problematic that the economic theory of crime in general and 
tax evasion in particular puts the focus on the cost side of the decision calculation and 
therefore increasingly sees itself as a negative economy. As an alternative,26 the concept of 
tax morality was developed. It assumes the deterrent effect of the expected penalty has 
only a minor influence on the willingness to pay taxes27 and that the decision to pay or 
avoid taxes is determined by the relationship between citizens and the state28 as repre-
sented by politicians.29 It can be seen that the willingness to pay taxes is influenced to a 
considerable extent by the tax compliance of society as a whole.30 This is why Frey’s anal-
ysis,31 which is often carried out from the point of view of deterrence, should give way to 
a positive economy. According to this view, potential criminals should be given positive 
incentives that motivate them to become legally active. In criminological literature, the 
deterrent effect is also by no means undisputed. Entorf,32 Levitt,33 and Entorf and Speng-
ler34 confirm the deterrence hypothesis, while Myers,35 Blumstein and Wallman,36 and 			
25  See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Louis L., The Economic of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy, 38(3), NATIONAL 
TAX JOURNAL, 355–363 (1985); James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Why do people pay 
taxes?, 48(1), JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 48, 21–38 (1992). 
26  See Bruno S. Frey, Plädoyer für eine positive Ökonomik, in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik: Festschrift 
zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. René L. Frey, 759–766, 761 f. (Christoph A. Schaltegger and Stefan C. 
Schaltegger, 2004). 
27  See the studies by Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated, 3, ECONOMICS 
OF GOVERNANCE, 87–99(2002); Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax morale and conditional cooperation, 
35(1), JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, 136–159 (2007). 
28  See Florian Follert’s contribution to this, Florian Follert, Die Bürger-Politiker-Beziehung im Lichte der Neuen 
Politischen Ökonomie: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag, 11, DER MODERNE STAAT – ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PUBLIC PO-
LICY, RECHT UND MANAGEMENT, 233–255 (2018). 
29  See Bruno S. Frey, Plädoyer für eine positive Ökonomik, in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik: Festschrift 
zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. René L. Frey, 759–766, 762 f. (Christoph A. Schaltegger and Stefan C. 
Schaltegger, 2004). 
30  See Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax morale and conditional cooperation, 35(1), JOURNAL OF COMPARA-
TIVE ECONOMICS, 136–159 (2007). 
31  See Bruno S. Frey, Plädoyer für eine positive Ökonomik, in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik: Festschrift 
zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. René L. Frey, 759–766 (Christoph A. Schaltegger and Stefan C. Schaltegger, 
2004). 
32  See Horst Entorf, Kriminalität und Ökonomie: Übersicht und neue Evidenz, 116(3), ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRT-
SCHAFTS- UND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN, 417–450 (1996). 
33  See Steven D. Levitt, Why do increased arrest rates appear to reduce crime: Deterrence, incapacitation, or 
measurement error?, 36(3), ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 353–372 (1998). 
34  See Horst Entorf & Hannes Spengler, Socioeconomic and demographic factors of crime in Germany, 20(1), 
INTER-NATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 75–106 (2000). 
35  See Samuel L. Myers, Estimating the economic model of crime: Employment versus punishment effects, 98(1), 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 157–166 (1983). 
36  See ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (2000). 	
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Cherry and List,37 for example, have no deterrent effects.38 
 
In the following, we assume a deterrent effect in the context of modeling. However, the 
focus of this analysis is not on an a priori assessment of the decision calculation of a po-
tential offender. Rather, it asks the question: What are the implications of economics 
when the state and the offender meet in court? If an individual violates the legal norms of 
a society, it endangers the stability of the system39 from which punishment should follow 
in order to stabilize the norm and in the sense of the atoning function of punishment. 
However, it is questionable which type of penalty should be applied in the specific case. 
The form of preferred sanction must be determined by carefully weighing the benefits 
and costs of enforcement. 
III. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PRISON SENTENCES 
 
In general, there are various ways to punish an economic criminal for his or her actions. 
Money, probation, and prison sentences or combinations thereof are possible.40 As of 
March 31, 2017, more than 7,000 people were imprisoned for economic crimes in Ger-
many.41 The penalty preferred from an economic perspective can be assessed by weighing 
costs and benefits.42 The analysis of costs and benefits can be carried out both at the indi-
vidual level of the offender and at the macroeconomic level. It is obvious that a prison 
sentence causes costs in the offender’s calculation. Frey and Ulbrich43 transfer the results 
of empirical happiness research for the first time to the field of jurisprudence, but focus 
on civil law—here, in particular, compensation for damages—as well as state organiza-
tional law. The aim of this paper is to attempt to extend the findings of the economics of 
happiness to criminal law and to discuss how this can influence the view of the costs and 
benefits of a particular type of penalty. 
 			
37  See Todd Cherry & John List, Aggregation bias in the economic model of crime, 75(1), ECONOMICS LETTERS, 
81–86 (2002). 
38  On the validity of the deterrence hypothesis, see also Jürgen Antony and Horst Entorf’s Meta-Study, On the 
validity of deterrence in the sense of the economic theory of crime, 116, DARMSTADT DISCUSSION PAPERS IN 
ECONOMICS, 2002. 
39  See Toby Jackson, Is Punishment Necessary?, 55(3),  THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY AND 
POLICE SCIENCE, 332–337 (1964). 
40  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECO-
NOMY, 169–217, 193 (1968); Florian Follert, Kriminalität und Strafrecht aus ökonomischer Sicht, 130(2), ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 420–437, 434 (2018). 
41  Of which 5,972 prisoners for fraud and breach of trust, 1,001 prisoners for forgery of documents, and 279 indi-
vidual for other offenses against property (source: Federal Statistical Office 2017). 
42  See Horst Entorf & Susanne Meyer, Costs and Benefits of the Prison System: Fundamentals in the Framework 
of a Rational Criminal Policy, 129, DARMSTADT DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS (2004). 
43  See Bruno S. Frey & Christian Ulbrich, Zur Bedeutung der empirischen Lebenszufriedenheitsforschung für die 
Rechtswissenschaft, 218(1), ARCHIV FUER DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS, 32–66 (2018). 	
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Modern economic happiness research has shown that the freedom of an individual as well 
as the possibility of flexible action and autonomous development determine the personal 
level of satisfaction to a high degree.44 If an individual is detained for a longer period of 
time, he or she must renounce this freedom, which naturally reduces the individual’s level 
of satisfaction. Furthermore, it is obvious that a prison sentence would break up social 
relationships, which would also have a high influence on subjective life satisfaction. This 
effect can be described as the cost of imprisonment to the offender. These costs are varia-
ble as they increase with the duration of detention. In addition, the offender must give 
up part of his or her income while serving the prison sentence because the offender is 
restricted in his or her choice of profession, which in turn limits the individual’s earning 
potential. These opportunity costs must also be taken into account in the offender’s cost 
function and can be described as lost wages. Furthermore, a criminal who serves a prison 
sentence incurs reputation costs, for example in the context of future business initiations 
(known as a “stigma effect”).45 
 
It becomes clear that the cost function to a large extent consists of variable costs, since they 
do not arise once, but rather depend on the duration of the prison stay. It can be argued, 
however, that the predominance of costs at the level of the offender also corresponds to 
the sense and purpose of a prison sentence. That is not to be contradicted. The problem 
with prison sentences, however, is that they also entail costs at the level of society.46 How-
ever, a prison sentence can only be regarded as meaningful from a macroeconomic point 
of view as long as the social benefit exceeds the costs incurred by society. 
 
The following table shows the economic burden in terms of current prison expenditure 
for a prisoner in 2011: 
 
Federal state Prison charges per prisoner (in EUR) 
Hamburg 
Brandenburg 
Rhineland-Palatinate 
Berlin 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Mecklenburg–Western 
Pomerania 
59,800 
52,500 
48,100 
47,000 
45,700 
 
45,000 			
44  See Bruno S. Frey & Claudia Frey Marti, Glück – Die Sicht der Ökonomie, 90(7), WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, 461 
(2010). 
45  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2014), 269. This effect can even affect the offender’s 
family, especially the children, cf. Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental Imprisonment 
on Children, 37(1), CRIME AND JUSTICE, 133–206 (2008). This effect can be described in terms of reputation 
costs. The loss of reputation is assumed here to be a fixed cost, since it can be argued that the social stigma of 
imprisonment is attached to the prisoner regardless of the length of the detention. On the other hand, it could 
also be argued that a short prison sentence is more likely to be concealed from the public than several years’ 
imprisonment. 
46  See Susanne Meyer, Die Tageshaftkosten der deutschen Strafvollzugsanstalte: Ein Überblick, 121, DARMSTADT 
DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS (2003). 
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Saxony-Anhalt 
Lower Saxony 
Saarland 
Hesse 
North Rhine–Westphalia 
Thuringia 
Bremen 
Baden-Württemberg 
Saxony 
Bavaria 
44,200 
43,400 
41,800 
41,400 
40,700 
38,500 
36,000 
33,900 
31,300 
29,600 
Average for Germany 39,500 
Tab. 1: Prison charges per prisoner, 2011 (source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 
2015) 
 
The imprisonment of a tax evader costs taxpayers considerable resources over many years, 
from daily meals to the costs for guards to the costs of resocialization47 after the prison 
sentence ends.48 The accommodation costs are variable costs, since they increase with the 
output quantity, i.e., the period of liability.49 Fixed costs are represented by the mainte-
nance of the penitentiary, which are incurred regardless of the period of imprisonment of 
the individual offender. It is assumed that the costs of resocialization increase with the 
length of the prison sentence. This is obvious, since an individual who cannot participate 
in everyday social life for a long period of time will be more difficult to resocialize than an 
inmate who is only imprisoned for a few weeks. These costs are also largely variable and 
therefore increase with the duration of detention. In addition, society does not allow the 
offender to contribute to economic value creation through work. The lost value added 
contribution is also to be allocated to variable costs, as it is incurred for each day of deten-
tion. Although the prisoner will also regularly pursue an activity in the correctional facil-
ity, this is often not likely to correspond to the potential of the prisoner. In addition, the 
state loses tax revenues that would have to be paid with a higher income earned from a 
professional activity performed outside of prison. This component of the cost function 
also increases with the length of detention. Due to the structure of the cost function, short 
durations, if any, would be preferable, as the variable costs lead to an increase in total costs 
over time. 
 
As already mentioned, from an economic perspective a prison sentence only makes sense 
if the costs are offset by a benefit that more than compensates for them. The benefits of 			
47  Although these are probably smaller with a tax or economic criminal than, for example, with a violent criminal. 
48  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, 169–217, 193 ff. 
49  See Horst Entorf & Susanne Meyer, Kosten und Nutzen des Strafvollzuges: Grundlagen im Rahmen einer 
rationalen Kriminalpolitik, 129, DARMSTADT DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS (2004), Here it must be 
taken into account that this is a delta view. If fewer criminals were sentenced to prison, c.p. fewer prisons would 
be needed. 	
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imprisonment for economic and tax offenses can be seen in particular in imprisonment’s 
deterrent effect. Costs at the level of the offender, according to the deterrent hypothesis, 
increase the price of a crime and thus create an incentive to turn to a legal act. It is con-
ceivable, for example, that the perception of prison sentences and the associated costs of 
deprivation of liberty in the case of such offenses may have a behavioral effect on potential 
offenders.50 This view is aimed at general prevention within the framework of the legal-
theoretical justification of criminal law.51 At the level of society as a whole, the benefit of 
the prison sentence is the gain in confidence (positive general prevention) in the legal sys-
tem and the deterrent effect. 
IV. A PLEA FOR FINES 
 
After comparing the costs and benefits of a custodial sentence, this paper will present fines 
as a more efficient alternative from an economic perspective. Becker (1968) already decid-
edly worked out why fines should be preferred if possible. However, Becker generally 
pleads for fines, which could possibly be viewed critically. While the application of fines, 
for example in the case of murderers, is not intuitively obvious, an economic or tax offense 
appears to be predestined to punish the offender in monetary terms because there is no 
immediate physical or psychological danger for an individual. 
 
If the fine is analyzed from an economic point of view, the costs of an economic or tax 
offense for the offender result from the loss of a share of his or her assets. With regard to 
the analysis of these costs, empirical happiness research can make a contribution to the 
(criminal) legal discourse.52 Psychological research has shown that the individual life satis-
faction of a subject can be used as an approximation to the benefit concept.53 Conversely, 
if the benefit can be measured by subjective satisfaction, this means that costs can be in-
terpreted as decreasing satisfaction. The economic analysis of happiness has shown that 
financial resources have an influence on subjective well-being.54 Poor people are therefore 
more unhappy than people without money worries, although the increase in wealth 
above a certain level has less influence on life satisfaction. This finding can theoretically 
be justified by the fact that individuals with greater financial resources are more likely to 			
50  See Horst Entorf & Susanne Meyer, Kosten und Nutzen des Strafvollzuges: Grundlagen im Rahmen einer 
rationalen Kriminalpolitik, 129, DARMSTADT DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS, 4 (2004). 
51  See DIETHELM KLESCZEWSKI, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL, DAS EXAMENSRELEVANTE GRUND-
WISSEN, § 1 no. 20 f. (2017). 
52  See the contribution by Bruno S. Frey & Christian Ulbrich, Zur Bedeutung der empirischen Lebenszufrieden-
heitsforschung für die Rechtswissenschaft, 218(1), ARCHIV FUER DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS, 32–66 (2018). 
53  See in particular the overview article by Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the measure-
ment of subjective well-being, 20(1), JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 3–24 (2006). 
54  See. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Measuring Preferences by Subjective Well-Being, 155(4), JOURNAL OF IN-
STITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 755–778, 765 ff. (1999); Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Öko-
nomische Analyse des Glücks: Inspirationen und Herausforderungen, 63(3), DIE UNTERNEHMUNG, 263–282, 
269 f (2009). 	
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |     VOLUME 5   NUMBER 1   2019 
FLORIAN FOLLERT  |  ON THE PUNISHMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR AND TAX CRIME: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
PAGE  64 
be able to purchase goods and services that meet their needs than poorer people. If, on 
the55 other hand, an individual loses large parts of his or her wealth, it is not unlikely that 
this will reduce this person’s subjective life satisfaction. 
 
In particular, if (significant) parts of the property have to be paid as a penalty, welfare 
losses will be experienced by the offender that could result in costs similar to the tempo-
rary renunciation of freedom, especially for persons who are accustomed to a high stand-
ard of living. Modern happiness research has also shown that the subjective level of satis-
faction is always subject to a comparison with the social environment.56 In the field of 
economic and tax crimes, it is not unlikely that criminals sentenced to heavy fines will lose 
their connections to their social peer groups after losing (large) portions of their assets. 
Accordingly, the penalty to be paid initially represents fixed costs for the offender. Similar 
to the prison sentence, a loss of reputation can occur that influences the social life of the 
convicted offender. However, it can be assumed that this is lower than in the case of im-
prisonment, since it is easier to conceal a fine, and the person concerned is not torn out of 
his or her social environment. If opportunity costs are also considered, the cost function 
can be extended to include lost interest income or other consumption satisfactions. 
 
The amount of the penalty must be set in relation to the total assets of the offender, which 
can be regarded as meaningful against the background of the results of empirical happi-
ness research. A nonlinear correlation is therefore assumed, so that the costs increase pro-
portionally more strongly the larger the share of the penalty in the total assets of the of-
fender becomes. It should be borne in mind that in the best case the fine should be calcu-
lated in relation to the total assets. A fixed fine that, first, is not based on the chances and 
the amount of the profit of the criminal act and, second, is not based on the financial 
circumstances of the offender, is perceived as unfair and inappropriate.57 The question 
arises as to the benefits of these costs. 
 
From a macroeconomic perspective, it is easy to see that the welfare of the population 
increases as a result of fines, as they do not incur any initial costs. Fines are rather transfer 
payments from the offender to society.58 To substantiate the significant financial benefits 
of monetary sanctions, it can be determined that 2012 revenues of €564 million were gen-
erated by this type of penalty (Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 2015). If one com-
pares these revenues with the detention costs presented in the previous chapter, it be-
comes clear once again why a fine appears to be preferable from an economic perspective. 			
55  See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Ökonomische Analyse des Glücks: Inspirationen und Herausforderungen, 
63(3), DIE UNTERNEHMUNG, 263–282, 270 (2009). 
56  See Bruno S. Frey & Claudia Frey Marti, Glück – Die Sicht der Ökonomie, 90(7), WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, 458 
(2010). 
57  See already JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, chapter ix. (1931). 
58  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, 169–217, 193 - 195 (1968). 	
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Also from an economic perspective, it is incomprehensible why, for example, a tax evader 
who withholds tax revenues from the state should incur additional costs for the state as a 
result of a prison sentence.  
 
In addition, this type of punishment can be seen as compensation for the victims, as both 
the amount of the damage and any additional fines are returned to the injured parties.59 
Becker and Becker60 plead for the amount of the penalty to be calculated on the basis of 
the total damage incurred. With regard to the benefit of the fine, it can be stated for both 
sides that no additional costintensive rehabilitation measures are necessary, since the pay-
ment of the fine can be assumed to have a deterrent effect on the offender and society 
cannot expect any further wishes for retaliation from the compensation payment.61 An-
other practical advantage of the fine is that it can be increased almost free of charge, while 
an increase in the prison sentence entails significant economic costs.62 
 
In the sense of general prevention, it could now be argued that the costs presented for 
potential offenders were too low due to the envisaged fine compared with a prison sen-
tence. However, the deterrent effect of the penalty could be considered as effective for a 
fine as for a prison sentence in the case of economic or fiscal crime. Especially for individ-
uals who seem to attach a high value to financial prosperity, a fine that deprives them of 
much of their financial resources could be an effective deterrent if the fine leads to a drop 
in the level of satisfaction. For the courts that determine the level of penalties, this leads 
to the conclusion that a fine is most effective when it is sufficiently high in relation to the 
offender’s financial situation. 
 
Critics of a fine could also argue that a criminal could buy his or her way out of debt 
against payment of a certain price (the fine). However, this argument applies in the same 
way to all other types of penalties, since the guilt is deemed to have been paid after the 
respective penalty has been served. The only difference is the unit of measurement of the 
price, which differs between the types of penalties.63 Another argument in favor of fines, 
particularly for tax offenses, is that they are proportionate to other offenses. The use of 
multiple years’ imprisonment for tax evasion could lead to a reduction in the sense of 			
59  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, 169–217, 194 (1968). 
60  See GARY S. BECKER & GUITY NASHAT BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF LIFE. FROM BASEBALL TO AFFIRM-
ATIVE ACTION TO IMMIGRATION, HOW REAL-WORLD ISSUES AFFECT OUR EVERYDAY LIFE, 139 – 141 
(1997). 
61  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, 169–217, 194 (1968). 
62  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1193–1231, 
1206–1207(1985). 
63  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, 169–217, 195 (1968). 	
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justice within the population. Especially in comparison with violent crimes, the impres-
sion could arise that the courts weight monetary aspects similarly or even more strongly 
than physical offenses. Against this background, it is quite conceivable that a long prison 
sentence for a tax offense in relation to a suspended sentence for a violent crime is per-
ceived as a draconian sentence. From the point of view of citizens, it could therefore be 
perceived as fairer if an offense aimed at money were also punishable by a fine, freely in 
accordance with the biblical legal principle of “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” 
which aims to exclude disproportionate penalties.64 
 
Those in favor of imprisonment will argue that imprisoning one offender will protect 
society from further crimes. In principle, the first question that arises here is whether de-
tentions result in a decrease in the number of criminal offenses. Kury and Scherr believe 
that the majority of prisoners could be released without compromising the safety of the 
population.65 The example of Finland clearly shows that “less imprisonment does not 
necessarily lead to more crime.”66 This certainly does not apply to dangerous, violent, and 
sex offenders67 or terrorists,68 but they do not make up the majority of prison inmates. 
 
If, however, one wishes to stick to this argument, it can be argued in the light of chapter 
two that, assuming that a crime is a rational act, no automatism can be assumed with re-
gard to further crimes. A potential offender always newly assesses the costs and benefits 
of a future decision, so that it is hardly possible to draw conclusions about the future from 
the past. The state has enough adjustment tools that can influence the calculation of a 
potential economic or tax criminal for the future.69 If, for example, the investigative be-
havior of the tax investigator changes, this has a direct effect on the probability of detec-
tion, so that further tax offenses can possibly be prevented. While violent offenders and 
sex offenders in particular often have personality disorders70 that could be cited as a coun-
ter-argument to the rational choice theory, it is much more probable that a potential of-
fender consciously weighs costs and benefits in economic and tax crimes so that the action 
can be influenced by government action and there is no inevitable potential for repetition. 
On the other hand, a prison sentence only protects society for a certain period of time 
against offenses committed explicitly by the offender. However, if intermediaries are 			
64  See Dennis Bock, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL (2018). 
65  See Helmut Kury & Albert Scherr, Kritik des Strafgedankens – abschließende Thesen, 24(1), SOZIALE PROB-
LEME, 164–173 (2013). 
66  See Helmut Kury & Albert Scherr, Kritik des Strafgedankens – abschließende Thesen, 24(1), SOZIALE PROB-
LEME, 164–173, 168 (2013). 
67  See Klaus M. Böhm, Opferschutz und Strafvollzug: Neue Wege zum Schutz vor gefährlichen Gewalt und Sexu-
alstraftätern, 40(2), ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK, 41–72 (2007). 
68  See Christin Armenat & Sebastian Kretzschmann, Die Ausweitung des Maßregelrechts – Ein probates Mittel 
zur Verhinderung terroristischer Straftaten?,, 54(1), RECHT UND POLITIK, 22–35 (2018). 
69  See Florian Follert, Kriminalität und Strafrecht aus ökonomischer Sicht, 130(2), ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GE-
SAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 420–437, 433–436 (2018). 
70  See Klaus M. Böhm, Opferschutz und Strafvollzug: Neue Wege zum Schutz vor gefährlichen Gewalt und Sexu-
alstraftätern, 40(2), ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK, 41–72, 41 (2007). 
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commissioned to carry out further tax evasions, they cannot be prevented by a prison stay. 
It could also be argued that contact with criminals in a prison could tend to increase the 
prevalence of other crimes. If one assumes—contrary to the approach advocated in eco-
nomic theory—that economic and tax crimes are not rational behavior, then one will have 
to admit that the probability of recidivism of an economic or tax criminal is most likely to 
be assessed differently than, for example, a violent criminal who is based on a personality 
disorder, which is why for this reason alone one would have to plead against imprison-
ment. 
 
However, with regard to the implications of this analysis, it must be mentioned that the 
fine can in practice cause implementation problems. For example, it is conceivable that an 
offender may not be able to pay an ordered fine due to pennilessness or the early transfer 
of assets to related persons. However, this does not alter the fact that the fine—at least 
from an ex post perspective—is preferable to imprisonment from an economic point of 
view. In addition, it would be conceivable that the offender would repay his or her liabil-
ity to the state by paying the attachable portion of his or her future income over a longer 
period of time.71 Here the legislator would have to create appropriate regulations, which 
do not make it possible for an economic or tax criminal to get rid of the fine all too easily. 
If a fine is not an option, the judiciary could resort to imprisonment as a last resort. 
IIV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Economic and tax offenses result in considerable economic damage, which is why the 
topic is open to economic analysis. Starting with Becker (1968), numerous theoretical and 
econometric studies look at the decision calculus of a potential economic or tax criminal 
and work out how the (rational) decision can be influenced by the state and society, while 
the present article takes an ex post view. It analyzed which type of punishment proves to 
be efficient from an economic perspective in order to punish an economic or tax criminal. 
While in judicial practice a prison sentence is often pronounced—the most prominent 
cases in Germany in the recent past were Middelhoff and Hoeneß—the present article 
argues that the imprisonment of a criminal in the area of economic and tax crime should 
be rejected from an economic point of view. A benefit of imprisonment could at best be 
seen in the deterrent effect, since the renunciation of freedom will result in a lowering of 
the level of satisfaction and a loss of reputation. If a deterrent effect is generally assumed, 
this could possibly also be achieved by a fine, as wealthy offenders in particular attach a 
high value to financial prosperity. The great advantage of a fine can also be seen in the fact 
that, from a macroeconomic perspective, a transfer payment flows, which results in a ben-
efit, while tax-financed resources flow away within the framework of a prison sentence. 
While Becker (1968) generally pleads for fines, this article takes a differentiated look at 
economic and tax crimes, which, in particular, affects material goods, and other acts that 
impair the welfare of individuals. In particular because there is no need for special physical 			
71  Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
169–217, 196 f. (1968), already pleaded for instalment payments. 
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protection of the population against tax and economic criminals—this is certainly not the 
case with violent criminals—the fine can be applied as a punishment when cost-benefit 
aspects are considered. 
 
Future research in this area should address the question of what level of penalty for a fine 
can be considered efficient in an economic sense. It certainly makes sense to start from 
relative values that are oriented to the individual financial situation of the offender. 
Within the framework of such considerations, the interlinking of economic happiness re-
search and (criminal law) economic analysis should also be further promoted. 
